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Abstract
Work requirements and long term poverty
Abstract
We study how work requirements can be used to target transfers to
the long term poor. Without commitment, time consistency requires all
screening measures to be concentrated in the first phase of the program.
We show that this increases the eﬀectiveness of workfare; it is optimal to
use work requirements for a wider range of prior beliefs about the size
of the poor population, and work requirements are used more intensively.
We compare these results with the optimal policy under commitment.
Keywords: long-term poverty, ratchet eﬀect, screening.
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1 Income transfers and incentive problems
To contain the cost of poverty relief programs it is important to channel resources
to those in real need of them. Ignoring this targeting requirement leads to un-
necessarily large outlays in the form of transfers flowing to people not in need
of support. We analyze how eﬀective work requirements are in targeting when
poverty is persistent.
We are not the first to evaluate work requirements in the light of these con-
siderations. Most notably, this issue has been addressed in a formal model by
Besley and Coate (1992). The novelty of our study is the focus on long-term
poverty. We let individuals’ income opportunities be correlated over time, which
means that a welfare administrator can collect information about these income
opportunities as time passes. Potential welfare claimants might understand this,
and adjust their behavior accordingly.
To get a rough idea of how this long-term perspective influences the cost-
benefit analysis of work requirements, consider the following problem. Let there
be two groups of individuals in society, one with a low income potential and one
with a high income potential—we call them L- and H-individuals, respectively.
The government wants to guarantee everyone a minimum income z, which is
higher than the income L earns in the market, but lower than the income H
earns. H-individuals may nevertheless claim benefits intended for the poor, since
the welfare administrator cannot observe a person’s income opportunities. Work
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requirements, or workfare, can be used to prevent such dissembling behavior.
Requiring welfare recipients to work c hours in the public sector to qualify for
transfers, makes it costly for those with a relatively high earning capacity to join
the program. Every hour spent in a public sector job could alternatively be used
in the private sector, and since a H has a relatively high income potential this
loss is relatively high. The negative eﬀect of a work requirement is that it crowdes
out L’s market income and thus necessitates larger transfers to the poor in order
to guarantee them an income above the poverty line.
Ignore for a moment the learning aspect associated with long-term poverty.
Assume that there is no correlation between a person’s present and future earning
capacity—i.e. that there exists only short-term poverty. Let the proportion of
genuinely poor be low. There are, in other words, a lot of potential dissemblers
around and it is important to deter them from joining the poverty program.
Let cs be the minimum level of public work that scares them oﬀ. As we have
constructed the problem, the government minimizes costs by imposing a workfare
program that requires the poor to work cs hours in exchange for their benefits.
Assume now that individual earning capacities are correlated over time. This
means that the welfare administrator can learn about peoples’ income potential
by keeping a record of their past behavior. In fact, since a work requirement of
cs separated the two groups, she correctly infers that those who participated in
the workfare program are genuinely poor. If she is free to change policy later on,
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she will certainly not make individuals work for their benefits in future periods.
Now that the screening is done, it is only costly to use workfare. But, and this is
the crux of the argument, if H-individuals perceive that welfare will be provided
unconditionally later on, they will not be discouraged from participating in a
poverty program that requires individuals to work cs hours in the initial period.
As this example indicates, in a multi-period framework it becomes essential to
specify whether or not policy makers can commit to the design of future poverty
alleviation policies. We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent policy programs
both with and without commitment.
Optimal policy
We find that work requirements should in general be concentrated in the first
phase of the programme. Compared with the cost eﬃcient policy for eliminat-
ing short term poverty, we find that workfare—as opposed to universal welfare—
becomes a more eﬃcient policy in containing the overall cost when poverty is long
term. In some cases though—which we specify in detail later—the concentrated
use of work requirements will scare away the poor from the programme. To avoid
that, the welfare administrator should allocate work requirements more evenly
in time, even though this implies that fewer non-poor people separate. Finally,
we analyze the optimal program if the welfare administrator can commit herself
and find that in many cases the optimal commitment policy coincides with the
equilibrium policy under non-commitment.
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Methodology and related literature
In addition to the light that our model sheds on an important policy issue,
we believe it has some methodological interest. Formally, we study the design
of a dynamic Bayesian game. Our problem is therefore closely related to the lit-
erature on dynamic principal-agent relationships which emphasize the role that
asymmetric information and long-term commitment plays in governance. Our
problem of alleviating long-term poverty resembles the basic structure of for ex-
ample a dynamic regulation problem. Still, the results we derive diﬀer sharply
from those obtained there. A central result in optimal regulation is that a reg-
ulator who is able to commit herself to a multi-period contract, ought to repeat
the optimal static policy in every period; and that this policy is not time consis-
tent: the regulator will not follow the plan if she is free to re-optimize later on
(cf Laﬀont and Tirole, 1990). Lack of commitment is therefore detrimental in
a standard dynamic regulation problem.1 In poverty alleviation it is not always
optimal to repeat the static program in each period, and, as a consequence of
this, lack of intertemporal commitment is not always a problem. Another notable
feature of our model is that if a semi-separating equilibrium exists, it involves
randomization from both the agents (welfare recipients) and the principal (the
1Weitzman (1980) was the first to use a principal agent framework to point out the negative
eﬀects lack of intertemporal commitment has on the agents behaviour. Freixas et al (1985)
developed the first game theoretic analysis of a dynamic principal-agent relationship governed
by linear incentive schemes. For other references and for a general discussion of this topic, see
chapters 9 and 10 in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993). Dillén and Lundholm (1996) use the framework
developed by Freixas et al to discuss optimal income taxation in a dynamic model.
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welfare administrator).
Before we present the details of our arguments, we should say something
about the scope of our perspective, and how it relates to the existing literature.
The literature on how policy instruments can be used to target transfers to the
poor is extensive—see Lipton and Ravallion (1995) for a discussion and references.
Although the possibility of using work requirements to screen the needy from the
not-so-needy had been discussed before, Besley and Coate (1992) were the first to
give a formal analysis of the argument.2 It is their model we extend to a dynamic
environment. We think this is an important extension, both because there is
virtually no theoretical work on the dynamics of poverty alleviation programs,
and because long term poverty is a serious problem: a substantial share of those
who live below the poverty line do so persistently.3
Admittingly, the “cost eﬃciency perspective” on poverty alleviation and the
eﬀects of workfare that we borrow from Besley and Coate, is narrow. One lim-
itation is that it considers work requirements solely as a stick that scares the
non-poor from claiming benefits. This is obviously not the whole story. Hav-
2See also Besely and Coate (1995).
3For example, Heady et al (1994) find that 10 % of the population in Germany are frequently
poor or near-poor. Rodgers & Rodgers (1993) conclude that about one third of measured
poverty in the US as of 1987 can be regarded as ’chronic’, and that over the period they
studied, ”poverty not only increased, it became more chronic and less transitory in nature” (p
51). Adams & Duncan (1988), in a study of US urban poverty, estimated that of the 13.4%
of urban people that where poor in 1979, 34.6% were poor in at least one year between 1974
and 1983, and 5.2% was ’persistently poor’—defined as poor in 8 out of 10 years.
In poor underdeveloped countries the problem of chronic poverty is even more pronounced,
Gibson (2001) uses data from a recent household survey in Papua New Guinea to conclude that
close to half of those classified as poor, has a chronic poverty problem.
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ing a job can also be seen as an essential aspect of life, something that provides
people with social recognition and self esteem. Another important point is that
making welfare claimants work for their benefits may prevent a deterioration of
their working morale and human capital. Furthermore, it is not obvious that
individuals are poor—as we assume—because they are endowed with an insuﬃcient
earning capacity. Alternatively, one may argue that it is the lack of well function-
ing economic institutions to deal with property rights, information problems, etc.,
which is the main reason why so many people live in poverty—see Hoﬀ (1996). We
also ignore the political legitimacy of diﬀerent poverty alleviation programs—see
Besley (1996). We are not saying that these arguments are unimportant, only
that they are irrelevant for the incentive problem we focus on.
Having pointed out the limits of our scope, we should, however, hasten to
add that we believe the problem we point at warrants attention. Our arguments
should be mentioned in a general debate about how one ought to provide assis-
tance to the long-term poor, which is an important debate, both in developing
countries and more modern welfare states.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a formal model
of the costs and benefits of using workfare in targeting the poor. In section 3
we characterize the cost minimizing program in a static framework. In section 4,
which is the heart of the paper, we introduce dynamics and study how workfare
can be used to minimize the cost of providing transfers to the long term poor. In
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section 5 we compare these results with the case where the welfare administrator
can commit herself. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A formal model of the costs and benefits of
using workfare to target benefits to the poor
As a prerequisite to the dynamic analysis, we analyze poverty alleviation in a
static (one period) model. We follow Besley and Coate (1992) and assume that a
welfare administrator, hereafter referred to as the WA, faces a target population
of a size normalized to 1. A fraction γ has a very low productivity aL and
a fraction (1 − γ) is endowed with a higher productivity aH . The latter are
also ’low class’, but not as destitute as the former. All people have the same
strictly concave utility function defined over disposable income (x) and leisure (`),
u(x, `), and a time endowment normalized to unity. People choose the level of
private labor earnings which maximizes their utility level. Without any program,
the L-people (and only them) earn a disposable income below the poverty line
z. The WA faces the task of designing a cost minimizing welfare program that
guarantees everybody at least the minimal income z.4
A transfer program consists of a menu {(bL, cL) , (bH , cH)}, where b is a money
4Poverty is thus defined exclusively in terms of income, an attitude that is ubiquitous in
public debate. Still, our main results would go through if the WA’s aim is to guarantee a
minimal living standard, including the value of leisure. For an analysis of the dynamics of
redistribution in a utilitarian setting, see Dillén and Lundholm (1996).
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transfer and c the number of hours of public work an applicant is required to carry
out in order to qualify for the transfer.5 The menu must guarantee that: (i)
all people voluntarily participate in the program, (ii) everybody at least enjoys
a disposable income z, (iii) nobody has an incentive to apply for the package
intended for somebody with a diﬀerent productivity, and (iv) the total cost of
the program, γbL + (1− γ)bH , is kept at a minimum (because it will be financed
by distortionary taxation on the other people in the economy).
Individual behavior
An individual with ability a, receiving the package (b, c) decides how much
income (y) to earn:
max
y≥0
u(b+ y, 1− c− y
a
).
Let us denote the solution by y(b, c, a). Normality of consumption and leisure
means that as long as y(b, c, a) > 0, the derivatives w.r.t. c and b are negative.6
The corresponding maximal utility level is written as v(b, c, a). Note that if
the transfer b and/or the work requirement c are very high, it may be optimal to
refrain from working privately altogether—the utility level then reduces to u(b, 1−
c). Note also that our concavity assumption on u (·) implies vbb < 0.
The costs of workfare
5As Besley and Coate, we shall assume that public sector work is unproductive. We discuss
the impact of this assumption in footnote 14.
6Regarding |∂y∂b |, Moﬃtt (1992) reports on a value of .37 for females, while Sawhill (1988, p
1103) reports on values in the range [.16,.71].
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For a given work requirement cL, let bL(cL) be the lowest transfer that guar-
antees L-people a disposable income of at least z:
bL(cL) + y(bL(cL), cL, aL) ≡ z.
Implicit derivation shows that dbL(cL)dcL = aL: a higher work requirement crowds
out private sector earnings with aL, and thus requires an extra aL Euro to top
up disposable income to the poverty line. Imposing a work requirement is thus
costly because it necessitates larger transfers to needy people.
We define cco as the work requirement that crowds out private sector earnings
completely:
cco
def
= max{c : y(bL(c), c, aL) ≥ 0}.
The necessary transfer bL(c) thus satisfies
bL(c) = bL(0) + aLc if c ≤ cco,
= z c ≥ cco,
and is clearly concave in c.
Another important value is the work requirement that brings L down to his
reservation utility level:
cmax
def
= max{c : v(bL(c), c, aL) ≥ v(0, 0, aL)}.
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Clearly, cmax puts an upper bound on theWA’s selection of work requirements.
The benefits of workfare
The WA has to oﬀer appropriate incentives to prevent H-individuals from
joining the program. Pretending to be poor can be easy or diﬃcult, depending
on what the WA observes. One possibility is that the WA observes no personal
characteristics; applying for a welfare package is then a suﬃcient condition for
getting it. Another possibility is that the WA observes private sector earnings,
and that welfare applicants qualify for transfers only when their earnings do not
exceed a certain limit. In this paper, we limit ourselves to the first case.7
The maximum utility H gets if he receives a transfer bH in exchange for a
work requirement cH is thus v(bH , cH , aH). On the other hand, when H pretends
to be of type L, he attains a welfare level v(bL(cL), cL, aH). The screening, or no
mimicking constraint can thus be written as
v(bH , cH , aH) ≥ v(bL(cL), cL, aH).
Obviously, it is optimal to choose cH = 0. Supplementing bH with a positive
work requirement implies a higher transfer to H, which increases the total cost of
7The income observable case is discussed in Besley and Coate (1992) for short term poverty
alleviation and in Schroyen and Torsvik (1999) for long term poverty alleviation. Allowing for
means-testing will in general reduce the need for work requirements, although Besley and Coate
(1995) have shown that even with a non-linear income transfers (including earnings subsidies),
workfare remains useful, as long as one is concerned with income maintanence. If the objective
is utility maintanence, work requirements loose their role once means-testing scheme becomes
flexible enough.
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the program. To ease exposition, we drop the subscript on the work requirement
since this policy is only relevant for the package intended for the poor.
Let bsH(c) be the minimum transfer H must receive in order not to register as
poor (superscript s for ’static’). This is an information rent—resources H receives
because the WA cannot observe his earning capacity. Its magnitude is implicitly
defined by
v(bsH(c), 0, aH) ≡ v(bL(c), c, aH). (1)
Requiring the poor to work for their benefits makes it less attractive for H to
mimic L and thus the minimum transfer bsH can be reduced. The following
lemma informs about the shape of bsH(c) (all proofs are in appendix).
Lemma 1 The transfer function bsH(c) has the following first and second deriv-
atives:
dbsH(c)
dc = −(aH − aL) if c ≤ cco,
= −aH cco ≤ c ≤ cmax,
d2bsH(c)
dc2 = 0.
Moreover bsH(0) = bL(0).
By the last property, universal welfare is equivalent to c = 0. Since the
transfer function is decreasing and concave in c there exists a critical value for
the work requirement on L-persons, cs, for which the transfer bH can be set to
zero and still secure self-selection, i.e. bsH(c
s) ≡ 0. It is easy to see that cs < cmax.
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Figure 1 displays bL(c) and bsH(c).
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 bL(0) 
cco      cs           cmax 
bHs(c) 
bL(c) 
aH-aL 
aL 
aL 
aH-aL 
aH 
bL(·) and bsH(·) when cs < cco (left) and cs > cco (right).
3 The cost minimizing static program
We can now construct the function which maps the work requirement c into the
total cost of the program,
Ks(c)
def
= γbL(c) + (1− γ)bsH(c).
By definition, this function gives—for any arbitrary work requirement—the min-
imal pair of transfer payments which satisfy both the poverty alleviation and
incentive compatibility constraints. As H-persons always have the option to stay
away from the program, they cannot be imposed any taxes. This is equivalent to
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requiring that bH(c) ≥ 0 or c ≤ cs. The WA’s problem can thus be stated as
min
c≤cs
Ks(c).
Since both transfer functions are piecewise linear but concave in c, there are
two possible solutions: either cs or 0. Workfare is either used so extensively that
H-people do not sign up for poverty transfers, or workfare will not be used at all
and poverty is alleviated through universal welfare. In the first case the costs of
alleviating poverty are γbL(cs); in the second, they amount to bL(0).
It is easy to understand that the choice between a welfare or a workfare
program depends on how large the population of the poor is relative to the
number of potential mimickers. The fewer potential mimickers there are in the
population, the lower is the cost of paying them the rent which prevent them from
applying for the package meant for the really needy. In the limit, as γ approaches
1, (almost) all individuals are of the L-type and it would be wasteful to distort
the behavior of (almost) the whole population in order to eliminate a cost (the
rent to the H-people) that is negligible.
Let γs be the value of γ for which the administrator is indiﬀerent between
universal welfare and workfare. It is then easy to check that
γs
def
=
bL(0)
bL(cs)
= 1− aL
aH
min{cs, cco}
cs
. (2)
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Thus, the WA will prefer a workfare policy iﬀ γ < γs.
To understand what comes later, it is important to keep in mind that the
transfer which H-agents receive is a discontinuous function of γ. It is defined as
βH(γ) ≡
bsH(0) > 0
0
if γ > γs,
if γ ≤ γs.
(3)
This model contains many interesting insights that we cannot elaborate on
here (but see Besley and Coate, 1992). We just mention that the discontinuity of
the rent function (3)—due to the concavity of the cost function—gives the problem
a particular feature which is absent in standard dynamic agency problems (like
regulatory problems), as will be seen in the next section.
4 Dynamics and the problem of targeting the
poor
So far we have followed Besley and Coate (1992) and taken it for granted that
the information people reveal by opting for a particular poverty program cannot
be utilized by the WA later on. Suppose now that the poverty program runs over
several periods, and that the WA can learn something about people’s earning
capacity as time passes. This assumption adds a new dimension to the poverty
alleviation problem: the fact that the welfare administrator can collect informa-
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tion about peoples’ income opportunities as time passes will be anticipated by
potential welfare claimants who will adjust their behavior.
We start by describing the classes of equilibria that exists when the WA is
unable to commit herself to a particular poverty alleviation program in the future.
Next, we discuss the optimality of the diﬀerent equilibria. In section 5 we compare
the non-commitment case with optimal policy under commitment.
Preferences are taken to be additive across periods, with a zero rate of dis-
count. Also the WA uses a zero discount rate to compute intertemporal costs.
This choice of discount rate is not crucial to our results, but considerably facil-
itates the exposition of the arguments. A prerequisite for our analysis is that
poverty is to some extent persistent. To simplify we make the extreme assumption
that individuals earning capacities are perfectly correlated over time. We do not
allow individuals to save or borrow, for several reasons. First, we want to limit
the connection between periods to one stock variable (information). Second,
once saving and borrowing is allowed, the definition of the poverty line becomes
more fuzzy. Third, it can be regarded as a stylized representation of the poors’
imperfect access to capital markets.
4.1 Equilibria: types and existence
The simplest framework to discuss long term poverty alleviation is a game with
two periods and four stages. The structure of this game is as follows.
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Period 1
Stage 1: The WA designs a first period poverty program [(b1L, c
1
L), (b
1
H , c
1
H)].
Stage 2: Individuals decide which package they want to sign up for.
Period 2
Stage 3 : The WA is not committed to any prior announcements. Given her
updated information on the basis of what she observed in stage 2,
she designs the cost minimizing poverty program [(b2L, c
2
L), (b
2
H , c
2
H)].
Stage 4: Individuals decide which package they want to sign up for.
Let γ2 be the WA’s updated belief that an agent who opted for bundle (b1L, c
1)
in the first period is of type L. We can simplify the game in several respects.
First, notice that the second period game is just like the static problem but now
for a belief γ2. Second, because the WA has to alleviate poverty also in the first
period, she will also set b1L equal to bL(c
1
L). Third, we claim that if the first
period transfers given to H-persons are not too high, L will never want to choose
the package intended for H and therefore first period transfers to H will not be
made conditional on a work requirement: c1H = 0. In the appendix, we give
suﬃcient conditions for this to be verified by the optimal policy. Thus, again, we
drop the subscript L on c without any risk of confusion. See figure 2.
| 
WA sets c1 
and bH1.  
| 
People choose between  
(bL(c1), c1) and (bH1,0). 
| 
WA updates her beliefs to γ2 and 
sets c2 and bH2 as in section 3. 
| 
The unidentified people choose 
between (bL(c2), c2) and (bH2,0). 
The time sequence in the simplified game
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If H applies in the first period for the bundle (b1L(c
1), c1), he gets (βH(γ
2), 0)
in the second. On the other hand, should he not register as poor he gets (b1H , 0)
in the first period and (0, 0) in the second. The values of these two options are
v (bL(c
1), c1, aH) + v (βH(γ
2), 0, aH) and v (b1H , 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH), respectively.
Depending on the magnitude of the transfers, and the work required, there exists
three kinds of equilibria.8 A separating equilibrium in which H-people do not
register as poor. To implement such an equilibrium the WA must either impose
extensive work requirements on those who claim poverty transfers, or she must
give generous transfers to the non-poor. On the other hand, with very low work
requirements associated with poverty transfers and very low transfers to the non-
poor, these non-poor clearly prefer to mimic the poor and we have a pooling
equilibrium. For intermediate values for the two instruments, we may have a
semi-separating equilibrium in which the non-poor randomize between registering
as poor or not.
Separating equilibrium
8The proper equilibrium concept for this game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This means
that (P1) the agents make an optimal choice in period 2 among the packages made available
to them by the WA; (P2) the WA0s design of the second period’s program should be optimal,
given her updated beliefs; (P3) the choice of the agents in stage 1 should be optimal given the
packages made available by the WA in stage 1 and taking into account the fact that the second
period program that is made available to them will depend on the WA0s updated beliefs, and
therefore on their first period choice; (P4) the WA0s choice of program in the first period is
optimal given the strategies of the agents and of her own 2nd period strategies; and (B) theWA
updates her beliefs by observing the participants’ first period behaviour, thus γ2 =Prob(agent
is of type L|agent chose in period 1 the package [bL(c1), c1]). In this subsection, we look at
continuation equilibria, i.e. strategies of the agent in both periods, and of the WA in period 2,
and an updating rule, that satisfy P1-P3 and B. See Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, pp 380-1). In
section 4.2, we inquire about the optimal choice for the WA in period 1, i.e. impose P4.
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We have a separating equilibrium when H prefers not to register as poor even
if the WA knows this and is thus convinced that all who do register are genuinely
poor (i.e. sets γ2 = 1). That is, if
v
¡
b1H , 0, aH
¢
+ v (0, 0, aH) ≥ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v (bL(0), 0, aH) .
Separation can be induced either by a welfare policy or by a workfare policy.
The lower boundary of (b1H , c
1)−values giving rise to a separating equilibrium is
found by letting the inequality above bind. Let bdH(c
1) be defined as the minimum
transfer that induces separating for a first period work requirement c1, then
v(bdH(c
1), 0, aH) + v(0, 0, aH) ≡ v(bL(c1), c1, aH) + v(bL(0), 0, aH) (4)
The following lemma informs about the shape of bdH(c) (proven in appendix).
Lemma 2 The transfer function bdH(c) has the following first and second deriv-
atives:
dbdH(c)
dc
=
vsb
vdb
dbsH(c)
dc
< 0
d2bdH(c)
dc2
=
(vsb)
2
vdb
[
vsbb
(vsb)
2
− v
d
bb
(vdb )
2
](
dbsH(c)
dc
)2
where vsb and v
d
b are shorthands for vb(b
s
H(c), 0, aH) and vb(b
d
H(c), 0, aH), resp.,
and likewise for the second order income derivatives vsbb and v
d
bb.
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Concavity of bdH(c) is no longer guaranteed by the assumptions we have in-
voked so far but can be established with some mild conditions on the risk aversion
coeﬃcients. In the sequel we therefore assume concavity of this transfer func-
tion.9
With a transfer function that is decreasing and concave in c there exists again
a critical value for the work requirement on L-persons, cd, for which the transfer
bdH can be reduced to zero while still securing self-selection, i.e. b
d
H(c
d) ≡ 0.
It is an empirical issue whether cd exceeds cmax or not. If it does, cd is not
implementable, since that would scare away L-people and make the program
meaningless. Then, the best the WA can do is replace it by cmax and leave a
positive information rent bdH(c
max) to H-people.
The following observations indicate a potential advantage of work require-
ments to separate to two groups:
1. bdH(0) > 2b
s
H(0): if the WA decides to fight first period poverty by using
welfare, she must oﬀer H-people more than twice the amount she needed
to give them in the static case. The reason is that vbb is negative.10
9The rhs of (4) can be rewritten as v
¡
bsH(c
1), 0, aH
¢
+ v (bsH(0), 0, aH). Since b
s
H(c
1) is
concave in c1, 1st period (and thus intertemporal) utility when mimicking is strictly concave in
c1. At the same time, 1st period (and thus intertemporal) utility when being honest is strictly
concave as well in b1H . However, if the first mentioned concavity is ”strong” compared with the
second one, the term [ v
s
bb
(vsb)
2 − v
d
bb
(vdb )
2 ] will be negative. In ther appendix to the working paper,
we shown that the sign of this term is given by the sign of d logRad logm + Rr, where Ra and Rr
are the coeﬃcients of absolute and relative risk aversion for uncertainty regarding full income
m. Decreasing absolute risk aversion and a not too large Rr is thus suﬃcient for concavity of
bdH(c).
10Evaluating (4) at c1 = 0, and noting that bL(0) = bsH(0) we get that v(b
d
H(0), 0, aH) +
v(0, 0, aH) = 2v(b
s
H(0), 0, aH).
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2. cd < 2cs: if she decides to use workfare to scare fraudulent H-people oﬀ,
she has to impose a higher work requirement than in the static case, but
the number of hours that are suﬃcient to drive H’s rent to zero is less than
twice the amount needed in the static case. The reason is again that vbb is
negative.11
3. bdH(c
s) = bsH(0): implies that b
d
H(c) everywhere lies above b
s
H(c).
Figure 3 shows the relation of bdH(c) to b
s
H(c).
bHd(0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bL(0) 
cs       cd 
aH-aL 
aH-aL 
bHd(0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bL(0) 
cco         cs       cd 
  aH 
bdH(·) (bold) and bsH(·) when cs < cco (left) and cs > cco (right).
With the two groups successfully separated in the first period, the second
period policy reduces to the first best type contingent policy: a cash transfer
bL(0) is oﬀered the poor while H-people receive nothing.
11Evaluating (4) at c1 = cd, noting that v(0, 0, aH) = v(bsH(c
s), 0, aH) and using the alterna-
tive formulation for the rhs, we get that 2v(bsH(c
s), 0, aH) = v(b
s
H(c
d), 0, aH)+ v(b
s
H(0), 0, aH).
Since bsH(c) is decreasing and concave in c, and v(b, 0, aH) increasing and strictly concave in
b, it follows that cd < 2cs.
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Pooling equilibrium
Clearly, if b1H and c
1are suﬃciently low an H-person may prefer to mimic
the poor even though the WA knows this and therefore set γ2 equal to γ1. The
condition for a pooling equilibrium is given by the inequality
v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v
¡
βH(γ
1), 0, aH
¢
≥ v
¡
b1H , 0, aH
¢
+ v (0, 0, aH) .
The upper boundary for pooling depends on the value γ1 takes. If γ1 ≥ γs
mimicking in the first period generates a welfare policy in the second period and
a monetary rent βH(γ
1) = bsH(0). In this case we can easily see that the up-
per boundary of the pooling equilibrium coincides with the lower boundary of
the separating equilibrium (since by definition v (bsH(0), 0, aH) = v (bL(0), 0, aH)).
If on the other hand γ1 < γs, we know that pooling in the first period im-
plies workfare in the second period and no second period rent for the non-poor
even if they pose as poor in the first period. In that case pooling occurs when
v (bL(c
1), c1, aH) ≥ v (b1H , 0, aH), which with equality is the equation for separa-
tion in the static model—eq (1). Hence, when γ1 < γs there will be an area of
(c1, b1H)-values that generate neither pooling nor full separation. It is for these
values that a semi-separating equilibrium will occur. See the left hand panel of
figure 4.
Semi-Separating equilibrium (when γ1 < γs)
The third kind of equilibrium requires the following set of inequalities to be
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fulfilled:
v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v (bsH(0), 0, aH) > v(b
1
H , 0, aH) + v (0, 0, aH)
> v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+ v
¡
βH(γ
1), 0, aH
¢
.
The lhs is H’s utility when mimicking as L when the WA believes everybody
is of type L (γ2 = 1), while the rhs is utility under mimicking when the WA sets
γ2 = γ1. Then we claim that there exists a semi-separating equilibrium in which
an H-person chooses the bundle intended for him (does not register as poor) with
probability
µSS
def
=
γs − γ1
(1− γ1) γs , (5)
and the WA chooses a zero work requirement in the second period (i.e. c2 = 0)
with probability
qSS(b1H , c
1)
def
=
[v (b1H , 0, aH)− v (bL(c1), c1, aH)]
[v (bsH(0), 0, aH)− v (0, 0, aH)]
. (6)
To understand this claim, note that if H mimics with probability µSS, a
Bayesian updating WA will believe that among those who opted for poverty
transfers in the first period exactly a fraction γs are genuinely poor. With such
a belief, the WA is indiﬀerent between a workfare and a welfare program in the
second period, and therefore willing to randomize between these two policies.12 A
12That the WA plays a mixed strategy is due to the discontinuity of the rent function (3). In
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simple computation shows that she must randomize with probability qSS(b1H , c
1)
in order to make H indiﬀerent between pooling with L-individuals and separat-
ing.13 The semi-separation equilibrium is depicted in the middle part of figure 4
below.
Let us summarize the facts we have established so far.
Proposition 1 Depending on the value of γ1, the following equilibria exist:
For γ1 < γs :
(i) separating equilibrium. H and L are separated in the first period, and a
type contingent welfare policy is implemented in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy
b1H ≥ bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax};
(ii) semi-separating equilibrium. H and L are partly separated in the first
period, and WA chooses randomly between welfare and workfare in the second
period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy bsH(c
1) ≤ b1H < bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax}; and
(iii) pooling equilibrium. H and L are not separated in the first period, and
a separating workfare program is oﬀered in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy
0 ≤ b1H ≤ bsH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ cs.
For γ1 ≥ γs :
the standard regulation problem, the rent to the eﬃcient firm is continuous in the regulator’s
belief. Her updated belief in the semi-separating regime is then uniquely given by equating the
second period rent to the opportunity cost that the eﬃcient firm has when pooling (cf Laﬀont
and Tirole, 1993, p 429).
13H’s utility when pooling and separating are v(bL(c1), c1, aH) + (1 − q)v(bL(cs), cs, aH) +
qv(bL(0), 0, aH) and v(b1H , 0, aH)+v(0, 0, aH), respectively. Since v(bL(c
s), cs, aH) = v(0, 0, aH)
and v(bL(0), 0, aH) = v(bsH(0), 0, aH), (6) follows.
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(i) separating equilibrium. H and L are separated in the first period, and a
type contingent welfare policy is implemented in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfy
b1H ≥ bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax}; and
(ii) pooling equilibrium. H and L are not separated, and universal welfare
is oﬀered in the second period; (b1H , c
1) satisfies 0 ≤ b1H < bdH(c1), 0 ≤ c1 ≤
min{cd, cmax}.
These diﬀerent equilibria are depicted in figure 4 (for the case where cd < cco).
bH1 
cs   cd  c1 
bHd(c) 
bHs(c) 
γ1<γs 
0 
bH1 
cd  c1 
bHd(c) 
γ1>γs 
0 
0   µSS        1   µ 
   (probability that 
 H separates)  
q(probability for  
    welfare in period 2) 
 1 
 
 
 
qSS(bH1,c1) 
S 
SS 
P 
P 
S 
The diﬀerent continuation equilibria (left, right) and the reaction curves
(middle) of the WA (dashed) and H (dotted) for the semi-separating
equilibrium.
4.2 Optimal poverty alleviation programs
Now that we have outlined the continuation equilibrium for an arbitrary first pe-
riod program (b1H , c
1), we have enough information to identify the cost minimizing
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first period program. The first period policy is made up of two instruments: c1
hours of work requirement on L, and a cash transfer b1H to H. Both instruments
are costly, but an appropriate use of them can make it more eﬃcient to target
transfers to the long term poor and to economize on second period transfers.
When H-persons separate in the first period with probability µ, the cost of the
program in that period is
K1(c1, b1H , µ; γ
1)
def
= [γ1 + (1− γ1)(1− µ)]bL(c1) + (1− γ1)µb1H . (7)
The first square brackets term denotes the number of persons displaying type
L behavior: the really needy and the fraction of H-persons pretending to be
needy. The second term gives the amount of transfers handed over to those
H-persons who reveal themselves as non-needy. Since both instruments c1 and
b1H give rise to first period costs, it will be eﬃcient to select them on the lower
boundary of each regime. Thus, if separation (µ = 1) is aimed at, the WA should
set b1H = b
d
H(c
1) and c1 ≤ min{cd, cmax}. An eﬃcient semi-separation policy
requires that b1H = b
s
H(c
1). And eﬃcient pooling is obtained when b1H = 0 and
c1 = 0. Notice that an eﬃcient semi-separation policy involves no randomization
on the part of the WA since qSS(bsH(c
1), c1) = 0 (identically in c1).
We now turn to second period costs. If the WA randomizes and chooses a
welfare policy with probability q in the second period, expected costs are given
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by
E[K2(µ, q; γ1)] def= γ1[(1− q)bL(cs) + qbL(0)] (8)
+ (1− γ1)(1− µ)[(1− q) · 0 + qbsH(0)],
where (µ, q) take on the values (1,1) under separation and type-contingent wel-
fare policy, (µSS, 0) under (eﬃcient) semi-separation, (0, 0) under pooling and
workfare (if γ1 < γs), and (0, 1) under pooling and welfare (if γ1 ≥ γs). In this
expression, the first square bracket term is the expected transfer which will be
handed over to L-persons, while the second square bracket term is the expected
amount of money that will be transferred to every H-person that pooled in the
first period with the L -types (those H-persons that revealed themselves in the
first period—a fraction (1− γ1)µ—receive no transfer at all).
With generic cost functions given by (7) and (8), we can inquire about the
kind of equilibrium that ought to be established in the first period, and how that
equilibrium should be implemented. We first define two critical values for γ1:
1. γSS makes the WA indiﬀerent between a separation policy with work re-
quirement min{cd, cmax} and a semi-separation policy with work require-
ment cs; and
2. γP makes the WA indiﬀerent between a separation policy with work re-
quirement min{cd, cmax} and a pooling policy with universal transfer bL(0).
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These critical values are given by
γSS
def
=
bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + (1 + 1γs )bL(cs) + z + bL(0)
, (9)
γP
def
=
2bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
. (10)
We can now formulate the WA’s optimal policy rule (illustrated in figure 5
and proven in appendix).
Proposition 2 (i) The critical γ1-values can be ranked as follows:
0 ≤ γSS < γs < γP < 1,
with γSS = 0 if cd = min{cd, cmax}.
(ii) If γ1 > γP the most eﬃcient policy is universal welfare inducing pooling.
If γ1 < γP and cd < cmax, the most eﬃcient policy is workfare cd inducing
separation. However, if cd > cmax, then for a small range of a priori beliefs
γ1 ∈ [0, γSS] the most eﬃcient policy is semi-separation with workfare cs.
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 | 
γSS 
| 
0 
| 
γs 
| 
γdp 
 | 
1 
γ1 
Separation with workfare cd in period 1. 
Type contingent welfare in period 2 
Pooling with universal welfare 
in period 1.  Universal welfare 
in period 2. 
cd<cmax : 
Semi-separation with 
workfare cs in period 
1.  Separation with 
workfare cs in period 2 
Separation with workfare cd in 
period 1.  Type contingent 
welfare in period 2. 
Pooling with universal welfare 
in period 1.  Universal welfare 
in period 2. 
cd>cmax : 
Separation with workfare cs. Pooling with universal welfare. Short term 
alleviation 
The WAs decision rules for long and short poverty alleviation.
Proposition 2 highlights that workfare should be used for a larger range of
prior beliefs in the first period of a long term poverty alleviation program than
under short term poverty alleviation. This policy, however, is non-stationary:
once people have been screened, workfare has no longer any role to play and
second period transfers are made categorical (a cash transfer to the identified
L-persons, nothing to the others). The other alternative, which then is used
’less often’, is a universal welfare policy: a welfare grant bL(0) is handed out un-
conditionally, to any person who applies for it. In a short term poverty problem,
this is the optimal policy for γ1 > γs. In the long term problem, γ1 must exceed
γP for this to be the eﬃcient policy. As the WA does not learn anything about
applicants’ types in this case, she enters the second period as uninformed as she
was in the first. Because γP > γs, she continues in the second period to hand
out a welfare grant bL(0) to anybody who asks for it. Put diﬀerently, for γ1 > γP
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universal welfare is a stationary optimal policy.14 Finally, there is the possibility
that the voluntary participation condition on the poor prevents using a high work
requirement (cd > cmax). In that case, separation with workfare requires leav-
ing some rent bdH(c
max) to the H-people because voluntary participation of the
L-people prevents the use of a work requirement cd. If there are many non-poor
around (if γ1 is very low), the dominant concern is rent reduction. And this can
be achieved by a semi-separation policy where a work requirement cs is imposed
in both periods. To see this, note that if exactly (1 − γ1)µSS of the non-poor
separate in the first period, the WA agrees to impose a work requirement cs in
the second period, and a first period work requirement cs is suﬃcient to make
the non-poor indiﬀerent between separation and mimicking. Though this policy
imposes a higher total work requirement (cs + cs) on the poor, it leaves no rents
to the non-poor, of which there are many around. In this case, we thus have a
stationary policy with a work requirement cs in each period.
14In Schroyen and Torsvik (1999), we showed that when income is observable and means-
testing possible, it may happen that for high γ1-values the pooling policy is dominated by
separation without work requirement. With pooling, the WA learns nothing and, if γ1 is
high, will want to separate in the second period without workfare. H-people then receive
bL(0) + b
s
H(0). When separating with welfare in the first period, H-people receive b
d
H(0) + 0.
If this amount is less than the former, it pays to separate with welfare in the 1st period. (If
income is unobservable, this will never be the case since bsH(0) = bL(0). But with means-testing,
it may be the case because bsH(0) < bL(0) as it is more costly for H to mimick L.)
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5 Optimal policy under commitment
So far we have analyzed the costs of diﬀerent transfer programs assuming that
the WA cannot commit to a future program. We have assumed she implements
the second period policy that minimizes costs, given the information she has at
that stage. In this section we characterize the optimal commitment policy and
verify how it diﬀers from the time consistent policy when the WA cannot commit.
The ”no commitment” assumption prevents a separating policy program from
specifying any work requirements or transfers to H-individuals in the second
period. Formally, separation and sequential rationality imply c2 = 0 and b2H = 0.
Repeating the static program is therefore impossible for a WA who operates a
program that runs over two periods. Does this constraint increase the overall
costs of poverty alleviation? Based on what we know about dynamic screening
problems in general, we might expect lack of commitment to be a burden—see
e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (1990) for a discussion of commitment problems in a
regulation context, and Dillén and Lundberg (1996) for a discussion of the welfare
consequences due to lack of commitment in optimal income taxation.
The fact is, however, that lack of commitment causes no additional screening
costs as long as separation by workfare is the cost minimizing policy and cd <
cmax. If the WA imposes a work requirement cd in the first period and a zero
requirement in the second, she is able to separate the two types at a total cost
of γ1[bL(cd) + bL(0)]. On the other hand, if she implements twice the optimal
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static workfare policy, she is also able to separate, but now at a total cost of
γ1[bL(c
s) + bL(c
s)]. We know that cd < 2cs and since bL(c) is concave in c, it
is optimal to impose work requirements only in one period. Hence, even if the
WA can commit to a future policy, and therefore choose c2 > 0, she is better oﬀ
choosing c1 = cd and c2 = 0.15
On the other hand, lack of commitment is a potential problem if cd > cmax.
To see this, suppose γ1 is low but still bigger than γSS. In this case it is clearly
optimal to use work requirements as much as possible, to constrain the rent of
the non-poor. The problem is that even a maximal work requirement in the first
period implies some rents to the non-poor. If the WA can commit to a second
period program she is better oﬀ implementing a program with work requirement
cs in each period, and achieve complete separation without handing out any
transfers to the non-poor.
Why are these results opposite to those in the regulation framework? The
manager of a regulated firm has a disutility of eﬀort function that is convex. The
regulator, who needs to compensate for this disutility of eﬀort out of costly public
funds, would therefore like to smooth out the distortion of eﬀort over time. Time
consistency, however, forces her to take the entire distortion in the first period.
On the other hand, the manager’s marginal utility of rent income is assumed
15Our assumption of constant productivity (normalized to zero) in the public sector partly
drives this result. Indeed, with a decreasing marginal productivity of public work, there would
be an argument for smoothing total work requirement over time. If this eﬀect is strong enough
it could counterweigh the concavity of the transfer function and make lack of commitment
costly.
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constant, and the intertemporal distribution of this rent is thus immaterial. In
our model, the compensation of the L-type is concave in the distortion, while the
rent seeking type (H) has a decreasing marginal utility of income. Not smoothing
out the rent is costly; not smoothing out the distortion is cost eﬀective.16
6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed how work requirements can be used as a device for targeting
transfers to the poor in an environment in which individuals’ earning capacities
are persistent over time. The welfare administrator can make it less tempting
for the non-poor to pose as poor in two diﬀerent ways. She can increase their
utility if they do not join the program by giving them a transfer or she can
reduce their utility when joining the program by imposing a work requirement on
applicants. A central feature in a dynamic model is that, unless the administrator
can commit to a future policy, separation requires type contingent transfers in
the second period. Hence all policy measures used to separate the poor from
the non-poor, must be concentrated early on in the program. We have shown
that this increases the eﬀectiveness of workfare as a screening instrument. There
is, however, one proviso to this result: in some cases the concentrated use work
16For this reason, the WA of a static poverty alleviation program with work requirement cs,
could do better by introducing a random work requirement: 0 and cd, each with probability 12 .
A similar observation was made by Brito et al (1991): the desirable eﬀects of randomizing the
income tax schedule can be reaped in an intertemporal model by committing to a non-stationary
income tax policy.
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requirements in the first period exceeds what the poor can bear. In order not
to scare them away from the program, the use of work requirements should be
spread over time and at the same time the non-poor should be presented with
a modest transfer. Though this will no longer result in full separation, it is the
best that can be achieved when the number of initially poor is ’small’. It is only
in this latter case, when some information rent must be given to the non-poor,
that the welfare administrator would achieve at better result if she could commit
to a long term workfare program.
In this paper, we let individual earnings capacities be fixed over time, and
thus ruled out the possibility for poor people to escape poverty in the future
by investing today in human capital. In a follow-up paper, we investigate how
work requirements may act as sticks and carrots in solving this moral hazard
problem, and how the latter interacts with the screening problem studied here.
Preliminary results are reported in Schroyen and Torsvik (2001).
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A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
The transfer function bsH(c) is implicitly defined as
v(bsH(c), 0, aH) ≡ v(bL(c), c, aH). (A.1)
As private earnings of H when mimicking can be freely chosen, equality of utility
levels is equivalent to equality of full incomes:
bsH(c) + aH = bL(c) + (1− c)aH (A.2)
Straightforward diﬀerentiation then gives the results. ¥
Proof of lemma 2
In the dynamic case, the transfer function is defined by the identity
v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, aH
¢
≡ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aH
¢
+D (A.3)
where D def= v (bL(0), 0, aH) − v (0, 0, aH). Using (A.1), implicit diﬀerentiation
gives
dbdH(c
1)
dc1
= −vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
dbsH(c
1)
dc1
. (A.4)
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Diﬀerentiating a second time and rearranging produces
d2bdH(c)
dc2
= −(vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH))
2
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
×µ
vbb(b
d
H(c
1), 0, aH)
(vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH))2
− vbb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
(vb(bsH(c
1), 0, aH))2
¶µ
dbsH(c
1)
dc1
¶2
, (A.5)
or simply
d2bdH(c)
dc2
=
(vsb)
2
vdb
[
vsbb
(vdb )
2
− v
d
bb
(vdb )
2
]
µ
dbsH(c
1)
dc1
¶2
. (A.6)
In signing the term v
s
bb
(vdb )
2 −
vdbb
(vdb )
2 , we may make use of the fact that
d log vbb(m)
(vb(m))2
d logm
=
d log(−vbb(m)
vb(m)
)
d logm
+ (−vbb(m)
vb(m)
) ·m, (A.7)
where m is full real income. Since D > 0, first period full income is higher when
being honest than when mimicking as L. The first rhs term is the logarithmic
change in the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, and the second rhs term is the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. ¥
Proof of proposition 2
We first prove part (ii) of proposition 2. For this purpose, we state three lemmas.
The first compares the minimal costs under a pooling equilibrium with those
under a semi-separation equilibrium (when γ1 < γs).
Lemma 3 Suppose γ1 < γs. Then any semi-separation equilibrium with a first
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period policy (c1, bsH(c
1)), c1 ∈ [0, cs] is less costly than the most eﬃcient first
period pooling policy.
Proof. The expected second period costs in a semi-separating equilibrium is
γ1bL(c
s), which is precisely the expected second period cost under pooling (a WA
who has learned nothing from the first period implements a workfare program
in the second period when γ1 < γs).17 On the other hand, the minimal first
period cost under pooling is bL(0), while it is
γ1
γs
bL(c
1) + (1 − γ1
γs
)bsH(c
1) under
semi-separation. Since bsH(0) = bL(0) and b
s
H(c) is decreasing in c, the minimal
first period cost under semi-separation is always below the corresponding cost
under pooling.
Thus, when γ1 < γs it suﬃces to compare the most eﬃcient policies yielding
semi-separation with the workfare policy leading to full separation. This is done
in
Lemma 4 Suppose γ1 < γs. Then the cost eﬃcient policy is separation with
work requirement min{cd, cmax} iﬀ γ1 > γSS, and semi-separation with work re-
quirement cs otherwise.
Proof. The proof is divided up in three parts.
17Recall that a semi-separating equilibrium can only occur when γ1 < γs. The expected cost
under semi-separation is given by (8) with µ = µSS (defined in (5)). Making use of (2), this
reduces to γ1bL(cs), whatever value q takes.
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Part 1
Among all eﬃcient policies inducing a semi-separating equilibrium, workfare (cs)
is optimal iﬀ γ1 < (γs)2.
Proof of part 1.
Consider a semi-separating equilibrium. The total expected cost under work-
fare and welfare are respectively given by:
γ1
γs
bL(c
s) + (1− γ
1
γs
)bsH(c
s) + γ1bL(c
s) (A.8)
and
γ1
γs
bL(0) + (1−
γ1
γs
)bsH(0) + γ
1bL(c
s). (A.9)
As bsH(c
s) = 0, workfare costs more (less) than welfare iﬀ
γ1
γs
> (<)
bsH(0)
bsH(0) + [bL(c
s)− bL(0)]
. (A.10)
Since the rhs is precisely γs, the result follows. ¥
Part 2
If γ1 ∈ [(γs)2, γs], then the total costs under semi-separation with welfare
is higher than the total cost under full separation with a work requirement
min{cd, cmax}.
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Proof of part 2.
A semi-separating equilibrium with welfare costs
γ1
γs
bL(0) + (1−
γ1
γs
)bsH(0) + γ
1bL(c
s) = bL(0) + γ
1bL(c
s). (A.11)
Separation with workfare costs
γ1bL(min{cd, cmax}) + (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + γ1bL(0). (A.12)
The latter is cheaper iﬀ
(1− γ1)bL(0) + γ1bL(cs)− γ1bL(min{cd, cmax})− (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax}) > 0
m
1− γ1
γ1
>
bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(cs)
bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
(A.13)
Since γ1 < γs, we have that 1−γ
1
γ1
> 1−γ
s
γs
= bL(c
s)−bL(0)
bL(0)
, and thus it is suﬃcient
to prove that
bL(c
s)− bL(0)
bL(0)
>
bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(cs)
bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
(A.14)
If cd = min{cd, cmax}, bdH(min{cd, cmax}) = 0 and the condition reduces to
bL(c
s) >
bL(0) + bL(c
d)
2
. (A.15)
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By the concavity of bL(·), the rhs is smaller than bL( cd2 ). And because 2cs > cd,
the lhs is larger than bL( c
d
2
). The inequality is thus verified.
Let us then consider the case where cmax = min{cd, cmax}. Then the condition
can be written as
bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
bL(0)
>
z − bL(cs)
bL(cs)− bL(0)
(A.16)
Clearly, when cco < cs < cmax, this is satisfied since the rhs then vanishes.
This leaves us with the case where cs < cco < cmax.
Because z−bL(c
s)
bL(cs)−bL(0) =
cco
cs
− 1 and bL(0) = bdH(cs), we need to prove that
1− b
d
H(c
max)
bdH(c
s)
>
cco
cs
− 1 (A.17)
or
2− c
co
cs
>
bdH(c
max)
bdH(c
s)
. (A.18)
Since bdH(c
co) > bdH(c
max), it suﬃces to show that
2− c
co
cs
>
bdH(c
co)
bdH(c
s)
. (A.19)
Because bdH(·) is concave, the value of bdH(cco) lies below the linear approxi-
mation of bdH(c
co) around cs:
bdH(c
s) +
dbdH(c)
dc
|c=cs(cco − cs) > bdH(cco) (A.20)
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or
bdH(c
s)− vb(b
s
H(c
s), 0, aH)
vb(bdH(c
s), 0, aH)
(aH − aL)(cco − cs) > bdH(cco). (A.21)
Since bsH(c
s) = 0, bdH(c
s) = bL(0), and (aH − aL) = bL(0)cs we get
1− vb(0, 0, aH)
vb(bL(0), 0, aH)
(
cco
cs
− 1) > b
d
H(c
co)
bdH(c
s)
. (A.22)
On the other hand,
2− c
co
cs
> 1− vb(0, 0, aH)
vb(bL(0), 0, aH)
(
cco
cs
− 1) (A.23)
because vb(0,0,aH)
vb(bL(0),0,aH)
> 1 (decreasing marginal utility of income) and c
co
cs
> 1 (by
assumption). (A.19) is therefore satisfied. ¥
Part 3
If γ1 ∈ [0, (γs)2], the total costs under semi-separation with workfare cs is higher
than the total cost under full separation with a work requirement min{cd, cmax};
unless cmax = min{cd, cmax} and γ1 < γSS: then the opposite is the case.
Proof of part 3.
If γ1 < (γs)2, we know that the cheapest semi-separation policy is a work re-
quirement cs. The cheapest separation policy has a work requirementmin{cd, cmax}.
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The latter is cheaper if and only if
γ1
γs
bL(c
s) + (1− γ
1
γs
)bsH(c
s) + γ1bL(c
s) >
γ1bL(min{cd, cmax}) + (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + γ1bL(0)
Using the fact that bsH(c
s) = 0, we get
γ1 >
bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bdH(min{cd, cmax}) + (1 + 1γs )bL(cs) + bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)
. (A.24)
If cd < cmax, bdH(min{cd, cmax}) vanishes and the inequality is trivially veri-
fied. On the other hand, if cd > cmax, bdH(min{cd, cmax}) remains positive, viz.
bdH(c
max) > 0. Since bL(cmax) = z, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for sepa-
rating with work requirement cmax to be the cheapest is that
γ1 >
bdH(c
max)
bdH(c
max) + (1 + 1
γs
)bL(cs) + z + bL(0)
. (A.25)
The rhs of this inequality was in the text defined as γSS. ¥
Finally, we compare the costs of a separation policy with those of a pooling
policy when γ1 > γs (and semi-separation is thus not an issue).
Lemma 5 Suppose γ1 > γs. Then, for all γ1 ∈ [γs, γP ], the total expected cost
of the most eﬃcient workfare policy inducing separation is smaller than the total
expected cost of a welfare policy inducing pooling. For all γ1 ∈ [γP , 1], the total
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expected cost of a welfare policy inducing pooling is smaller than the total expected
cost of the most eﬃcient policy inducing separation.
Proof. Let γd make the WA indiﬀerent between a separation policy with
work requirement min{cd, cmax}workfare and a separation policy with welfare
bdH(0). γ
d satisfies
K1(min{cd, cmax}, bdH(min{cd, cmax}), 1; γd) = K1(0, bdH(0), 1, γd) (A.26)
and is given by
γd
def
=
[bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})]
[bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})] + [bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(0)]
. (A.27)
Whenever γ1 ∈ [γd, 1], the optimal separation policy is one based on welfare .
This policy gives rise to a total cost of γ1bL(0)+(1−γ1)bdH(0)+ γ1bL(0). The total
cost of the most eﬃcient pooling policy amounts to bL(0)+ γ1bL(0)+(1−γ1)bsH(0).
Comparing these costs it follows that separation with welfare costs less than
pooling if and only if
bdH(0)− 2bsH(0) < bL(0)− bsH(0). (A.28)
But since bL(0) = bsH(0), (A.28) will always be violated, and we can conclude that
it will never pay to try to separate the two types with a welfare policy in a long-
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term poverty model. With (A.28) violated, pooling will dominate separation
with welfare for all γ1 ∈ [γd, 1]. But for γ1 = γd, we know that a separating
equilibrium with welfare costs exactly as much as a separating equilibrium with
workfare. This means that the latter policy will also be dominated by pooling
for some beliefs γ1 below γd. Solving for the belief γ1 which equates the cost of
pooling (bL(0) + γ1bL(0) + (1− γ1)bsH(0)) with the total cost of separation with
workfare (γ1bL(min{cd, cmax}) + γ1bL(0) + (1− γ1)bdH(min{cd, cmax})) yields
γ1 =
2bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
(A.29)
The rhs is defined in the text as γP .
We are now in a position to prove proposition 2.
Proof of part (ii) of proposition 2. By lemma 3, and since γs < γd,
we need only to compare semi-separation with separation with a work require-
ment min{cd, cmax} when γ1 < γs. By lemma 4, best semi-separation policy is
a work requirement cs, and it is cheaper than separation with a work require-
ment min{cd, cmax} iﬀ γ1 < γSS. On the other hand, when γ1 > γs and semi-
separation is not an issue, lemma 5 tells that separation with a work requirement
min{cd, cmax} is cheaper than pooling iﬀ γ1 < γP . ¥
Proof of part (i) of proposition 2. From the definitions of γP and γd,
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it follows that γP < γd iﬀ
2bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
<
[bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})]
[bdH(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})] + [bL(min{cd, cmax})− bL(0)]
(A.30)
If cd = min{cd, cmax}, this inequality reduces to
2bL(0)
bL(cd) + bL(0)
<
bdH(0)
bdH(0) + bL(c
d)− bL(0)]
(A.31)
which is equivalent to
[bL(c
d) + bL(0)][2bL(0)− bdH(0)] < 0, (A.32)
and therefore satisfied.
If cmax = min{cd, cmax}, we need to check whether
2bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
bL(cmax) + bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
<
[bdH(0)− bdH(cmax)]
[bdH(0)− bdH(cmax)] + [bL(cmax)− bL(0)]
. (A.33)
This inequality reduces to
[bdH(0)− 2bL(0)][bL(0)− bL(cmax)] < 0, (A.34)
and is also clearly verified.
49
From the definitions of γP and γs, it follows that γs < γP is equivalent to
bL(0)
bL(cs)
<
2bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
bL(min{cd, cmax}) + bL(0)− bdH(min{cd, cmax})
. (A.35)
If cd = min{cd, cmax}, this inequality reduces to
bL(0)
bL(cs)
<
2bL(0)
bL(cd) + bL(0)
, (A.36)
or
bL(c
s) >
bL(0) + bL(c
d)
2
. (A.37)
Above, in the proof of part 2 of lemma 4, we argued this to be the case.
If cmax = min{cd, cmax}, we need to check whether
bL(0)
bL(cs)
<
2bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
bL(cmax) + bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
. (A.38)
But this inequality can be rearranged into
bL(0)− bdH(cmax)
bL(0)
>
z − bL(cs)
bL(cs)− bL(0)
, (A.39)
which was also shown to hold in part 2 of lemma 4.
We can therefore conclude that
γs < γP < γd. (A.40)
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It then remains to show that γSS < γs. Using the definitions of these two
critical values, this can be seen to be equivalent to
bdH(c
max)[bL(c
s)− bL(0)] < [(1 +
1
γs
)bL(c
s) + z + bL(0)]bL(0). (A.41)
But as cmax > cs, bdH(c
max) < bdH(c
s) = bL(0), and the lhs is thus smaller than
bL(0)[bL(c
s)− bL(0)]. Since
bL(0)[bL(c
s)− bL(0)] < [(1 +
1
γs
)bL(c
s) + z + bL(0)]bL(0) (A.42)
we have shown that γSS < γs. ¥
Suﬃcient conditions for L-people not to take-the-money-and-run
Consider a first period program
©
[bL(c
1), c1] ,
£
bdH(c
1), 0
¤ª
intended to separate
the two types. An L -person will not choose
£
bdH(c
1), 0
¤
iﬀ
v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, aL
¢
+ v(0, 0, aL) ≤ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aL
¢
+ v (bL(0), 0, aL) . (A.43)
We will first give suﬃcient conditions for this to hold when c1 = 0 (lemma 6),
and then show that if it holds for c1 = 0, it will also hold for any c1 ∈ (0, cmax]
(lemma 7).
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Lemma 6 vb(b, 0, a) ·L(b, 0, a) suﬃciently convex in b guarantees that a low abil-
ity person does not to take the money and run (t-m-r) when c1 = 0. Suﬃcient
conditions for convexity of vbL are (taken together): decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion regarding consumption, normality of leisure, a labour supply function that is
convex in lump sum income.
Proof.
By the definition of bdH(c
1), we have that
v
¡
bdH(0), 0, aH
¢
+ v(0, 0, aH) = 2v (bL(0), 0, aH) . (A.44)
We would like to show that
v
¡
bdH(0), 0, aL
¢
+ v(0, 0, aL) < 2v (bL(0), 0, aL) . (A.45)
Define
RHS(c1, a) = v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, a
¢
+ v(bL(0), 0, a) (A.46)
and
LHS(c1, a) = v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, a
¢
+ v(0, 0, a). (A.47)
Then (A.45) follows from (A.44) when d[RHS(0,a)−LHS(0,a)]da < 0.
Since
v(b, 0, a) = u(b+ aL∗, 1− L∗), (A.48)
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Figure 1:
where L∗ is the optimal labour supply satisfying the foc uxa− u`, we have that
∂v(b, 0, a)
∂a
= vb(b, 0, a) · L(b, 0, a) = (vbL)(b,0,a). (A.49)
Therefore,
d[RHS(0, a)− LHS(0, a)]
da
= {(vbL)(bL(0),0,a) − (vbL)(bdH(0),0,a)}
− {(vbL)(0,0,a ) − (vbL)(bL(0),0,a)}. (A.50)
With decreasing marginal utility of income and normality of leisure, vbL is
decreasing in b, and both curly bracket terms are positive. Consider then the
figure below.
If vbL is suﬃciently convex in b, the above expression is negative.
The second derivative of vbL w.r.t. b is given by
53
∂2(vbL)
∂b2
= uxxxL+ 2uxx
∂L
∂b
+ ux
∂2L
∂b2
(A.51)
Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that uxxx > 0. The second term is
positive since leisure is assumed to be a normal good. Utility maximization does
not impose restrictions on the sign of ∂
2L
∂b2
. It can go either way. With Cobb-
Douglas preferences, for example, labour supply is linear in lump sum income.
The above argument is valid for bdH(0) slightly above 2bL(0). But, as we
have argued in the text, decreasing marginal utility of income is the reason why
bdH(0) > 2bL(0). The faster marginal utility in income is falling, the more will
bdH(0) exceed 2bL(0). But while the extent to which b
d
H(0) exceeds 2bL(0) is
dependent on the degree of absolute risk aversion, the convexity of vbL depends on
the sensitivity of absolute risk aversion to income and on the curvature properties
of the labour supply function. The two aspects are therefore not at odds with
one another. ¥
Lemma 7 If an L-person does not have an incentive to t-m-r when c1 = 0, he
will not have it either for any c1 ∈ (0, cmax].
Proof.
Suppose that the low ability person does not have an incentive to t-m-r when
the work requirement is zero, i.e.
v
¡
bdH(c
1), 0, aL
¢
+ v(0, 0, aL) ≤ v
¡
bL(c
1), c1, aL
¢
+ v (bL(0), 0, aL) (A.52)
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for c1 = 0.
Since bdH(c
1) is decreasing in c1, the utility when dissembling as H, will cer-
tainly decrease. On the other hand, for any c1 ∈ [0, cco], v (bL(c1), 0, aL) =
v (bL(0), 0, aL), so that the intertemporal utility when behaving honest remains
the same. We may thus conclude that for any c1 ∈ (0, cco], the low ability person
will not t-m-r if such incentive is absent for c1 = 0.
It then remains to check whether t-m-r may become lucrative for c1 ∈ (cco, cmax].
Let us for that purpose analyze d[RHS(c
1,aL)−LHS(c1,aL)]
dc1 for c
1 ∈ (cco, cmax]. If
this expression is always negative, we can conclude that the incentives to t-m-r
only deteriorate.
Substitution gives us
d[RHS(c1, aL)− LHS(c1, aL)]
dc1
=
∂v(bL(c
1), c1, aL)
∂c1
− vb(bdH(c1), 0, aL)
dbdH(c
1)
dc1
=
∂u(z, 1− c1)
∂c1
+ vb(b
d
H(c
1), 0, aL)
vb(b
s
H(c
1), 0, aH)
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
aH ,
where we have made use of lemma 2 and the fact that for c1 ≥ cco, db
s
H(c
1)
dc1 = −aH .
Since H is unconstrained, the foc w.r.t his optimal earnings (y∗) allows us to
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write vb(bsH(c
1), 0, aH)aH as u`(z + y∗, 1− c1 − y
∗
aH
). We then get
d[RHS(c1, aL)− LHS(c1, aL)]
dc1
=
− u`(z, 1− c1) +
vb(b
d
H(c
1), 0, aL)
vb(bdH(c
1), 0, aH)
u`(z + y
∗, 1− c1 − y
∗
aH
) >
− u`(z, 1− c1) + u`(z + y∗, 1− c1 −
y∗
aH
)
where the inequality follows from vb(b
s
H(c
1),0,aL)
vb(b
d
H(c
1),0,aH)
> 1. Because consumption is
a normal good, the last expression is positive, and we can conclude that the
incentive to t-m-r continues to deteriorate for values of c1 ≥ cco. ¥
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